Ethical Subjectivism: Part 10

I have not written all that I think about ethics. Ethics is a very large and complex subject. I believe it is actually devalued as a discipline by most people because it is generally inconvenient and difficult. Many ethical theories are at odds with much of what transpires in Capitalist and authoritarian societies. Most people believe in some sort of command theory of ethics, such as Voluntarism, which puts ethics and morals beyond objective research. Nonetheless, there has been a flurry of books and increased academic interest in ethics during the last decade, probably in response to the obvious  degradation of morality in advanced societies.

I have posted a number of articles on ethics, which I see as workbooks in my Moral Agents project. I hope to rework those writings into a book on ethics, time and funds permitting. Given that my relativist views are unpopular in academia, and even more unpopular among ordinary people in the United States, I am deterred from going to the trouble and expense of producing a book on ethics. If, however, I do make a book, the detailed analysis and other aspects of ethics omitted from the work presented here would be included. As I said, I have not written all that I think about ethics.

I disagree with the ethical theories I have read, at least in some aspect of their premises or conclusions or orientation. I think, for example, it is a mistake to focus on the individual, particularly in trying to guess and even evaluate intentions and motivations. Scientific studies on such matters are valid, when they relate observable gross behavior to brain function using PET scans and the like. I dismiss Freudian and Jungian and other such theories of the psyche as overly intellectual, misguided or just mysticism. The notion that our conscious selves are evidence of a persona beyond our material existence, something more than brain function, is simply spiritualism without any scientific support. I maintain that spiritualism has nothing whatsoever to do with ethical principles, so cannot justify moral behavior. In other words, in my conception, ethics is grounded in the behavior of moral agents in their social relations.

On the desert island, morality collapses into the isolated individual. Everything that applies to society applies to the individual, considered as a society of one, provided the individual inherits a culture from society. This is an important consideration, as culture appears in the individual as "conscience" or moral sensibility. However, individual pschology is very hard to study, and highly variable, whereas it is easier to grasp the integrated result in larger societies. Thus, I believe the proper arena for the study of ethics and morals is society. This means ethical principles and moral maxims have to be stated in social, not individual, terms. It is possible there is such a thing as individual ethics and morality, which might apply to tigers and lions (or ETs) who live their lives as loners. But, the species of my ethical interest - chimpanzees, bonobos and human, primates all - are gregarious and social, not individualists. In fact, almost all the debate that goes on about morality is about social situations, even when ethicists are worried about intentions, motives and other "internal" states. The notorious Trolley Problem, for instance, is all about what someone will do to others, even while philosophers rage on about what the decision maker is thinking or feeling. (The solution to that problem, if any, has to be social, not individual, in nature.)

Ethical theories must answer the question, what ought I do? In addition, they must provide some motivation (obligation or duty) that brings about moral behavior. In this theory of normative networks, both of those functions are fulfilled by social norms. Social norms are the standards of behavior in a given society; i.e., they prescribe what one ought to do. Social norms vary from society to society, as do ethical principles. In the United States, for example, "greed is good," whereas in many other places such a statement arouses loathing and disgust. Americans have a different concept of community and the relationship of individuals to it than most other peoples, which leads to different concepts of good and moral maxims. In most cases, there is no point in trying to reconcile conflicts about what is good or right, because they are parts of different, incompatible world views. It is not a matter of different symbol sets, as in using Roman or Arabic numerals to count. It is a matter of entirely different primary concepts, as in Euclidean or Riemannian geometry. It took a long time, but it was eventually proved that Euclid's parallel postulate is independent (self-standing), which makes Euclidean geometry a different exercise from that of Lobachevsky, even if we think both of them are "geometries." So it is with societies that hold different ethical precepts. Members of each society feel their social norms sufficiently answer the question, what are my duties?

'Ought,' then, is a feeling, an emotion that people have about what they do. It is that feeling which is motivating. I believe the feeling is a result of training from an early age. That training is not always successful, as there are people who seem to have no moral "conscience" at all. It is commonplace to imagine there is a little voice in one's head that prompts one to do the right thing. Of course, that voice only issues when there is temptation to do something else. Most of the time, most people just go about their business unthinkingly because the training is very effective. Most of the time what we do is automatic, zombie-like. Moral judgement, I think, is actually a rare event for most people. The reason people feel obligated - compelled -  to obey social norms is simply that they are programmed to do so.

The foregoing reveals certain features of the ethical theory I propose. First, there is no morality without moral judgement, which occurs when there is a conflict or a choice in view. Simply doing what one is programmed to do is amoral. I find it very difficult to blame zombies for their condition. In drawing this conclusion, I also propose that those who truthfully claim they were following orders are to some degree exempted from responsibility. However, when it is discovered that someone is a zombie, I believe that one becomes eligible for serious ethical retraining, provided we also believe that  the person should be a moral agent. In many societies, including the United States, there is no such standard of moral performance; i.e., it is acceptable to be a zombie. In those societies, all that can be done about zombies that violate social norms is prevent them from doing more damage. (Society may elect to defend itself by punishing violators of its norms, even if it also elects not to induce and encourage responsible behavior.)

Second, this ethical theory is analogous to Darwinian evolution. Social norms develop gradually and are difficult to change; i.e., stable societies resist changing norms. For whatever reason,  when social situations change, norms change. As in biological evolution, some norms succeed and others fail as they are tested in social situations. Anthropologists and sociologists study this sort of thing in detail; i.e., determining what are the social norms and how they apply is a science, not an art. But sociology is not the same thing as Ethics. Ethics studies the relations of whatever 'ought' is discovered, as a system of recomendations about living in social situations. In this sense, 'ought' is always prospective, whereas the discovery and investigation of social norms is retrospective. We might find that cheating is prohibited in most societies, but 'we ought not cheat' goes beyond that finding in proposing how members of society should behave henceforth.

One of the most important reasons for thinking that ethical conceptions change with social  forms is the rapid series of changes that have occurred since the Renaissance. In Western countries particularly, social organization is vastly idfferent today from it once was. Aristocrats were once immune from prosecution for the harm they caused common people, as they were conceived to have some special dispensation from the gods. Priests were once given the power of life and death over their congregations, based on a mere priestly opinion of one's worth. Thus, refusal to obey a priest could result in an Inquistorial burning at the stake. Those horrors and many other things are gone. The Industrial and Information revolutions are changing social norms radically and rapidly. I believe slavery was made uneconomic by new industrial technologies, despite recent attempts of some Conservative revisionist economists to prove otherwise. I doubt anyone ever wanted to be a slave, so, now that it is unnecessary, it has become unethical to enslave or enserf people.

A friend pointed out to me that Prof. Lynn Hunt just released a book, Inventing Human Rights, (reviewed last week in NYT) that shows how our ideas about rights evolved. Before the Enlightenment, no one thought there were any human rights. The French Revolution made human rights an ethical principle by fiat, and today we are very concerned about that principle and its universal application. Human rights are a very good and visible example of the evolution of ethics, which I suggested several years ago as the Principle of Moral Evaporation.

Third, my primary interest is theoretical, in what's come to be called "Meta-Ethics" but which I call "Ethics." Normativity is what I call "Morality," although lately I have used the fancier, intellectual title more often. I prefer the plainer, more direct terms whenever there is no need for a substitute or re-definition. I cannot figure out, for instance, what we do with :"ethics" if the subject is now "meta-ethics." Perhaps those committed to meta-ethics mean by ethics what we used to call morals, but that that doesn't explain why "ethics and morals" is still a common label. I also take meta-theories as theories about logical structures or rules of reasoning, as in "meta-physics" being "about physics." There is the doing of something, and the commenting upon or criticism of it.

This work does not intend to analyze the structure of ethical theories in general, nor define some universal terms and rules that one must associate with ethical premises. I think those are discovered in the process of scientific investigation of societies. What this work is intended to justify is the de facto finding that ethics and morals vary from time to time and place to place. I have tried to expose some general principles and heuristics that are usually associated with ethical behavior. I have not tried in any way to say that this is right and that is wrong. This is not a work of casuistry. I do not think that casuistry is a legitimate exercise except for tyrants.

In the course of this study and writing, I came to a quite different conception of ethics than what I had at the start. I am surprised by my findings, and the position I now defend. I think my views are sufficiently unique to warrant putting them before the public for consideration.