Ethical Subjectivism: Part 5

Notes: Social Conscience

Perhaps the preceding transition in orientation from subjective to public and social was too abrupt. The following is a discussion of difficulties in that transition.

How it is possible to think about society in a subjective philosophy? Doesn't that concede the existence of a real, non-subjective world?
 

One answer to that objection was Kant's idealism, in which noumena (reality) was forever beyond reach, but nothing prevented construction of ideals based on the phenomena (experience). In experience, the noumena impinged on our minds as observed phenomena. I think Kant provides a good starting point, in that I also claim that knowledge is based on experience, but I do not propose the separate existence of any noumena or ideals (concepts). As a materialist, I propose that there is just one kind of stuff - the stuf of our Universe - and that we are made of that stuff. Intelligent beings have ideas and concoct explanations, but that is the result of organzing the stuff in a certain way. I do not subscribe to the separate existence of souls, minds or ideas, as I think everything that we need to know, and everything that we can know, is built on whatever the stuff of the Universe is.

All of that of which we are aware only proves that we are aware (Descartes' cogito), not that there is anything other than awareness. It is a strange result of being aware, that the very fact of awareness separates the perception from direct pereception (feeling) of existence; i.e., conscious perceptions are always projections. This why, in reverse, it is so easy to be carried away by projections on the silver screen into worlds of our imagination that (probably) do not exist. Even unconscious perception is a tricky thing, for example our feeling that we are something. Because my medical condition is gradually ruining m nervous system, I do not feel things as I once did. My toes and fingers, for example, often do not exist, except in my imagination of myself. When I look at those nearly nerve-dead parts, I know they are part of me. I even know my typing fingers - what few of them still work in that capacity - are doing something on the keyboard. (I can at least make them do that.) But, with little kinaestheic feedback, I often feel as if some machine were doing the typing, not me. If I get cut or bruised in those sensory-deprived areas, I have no idea that it happened. I am sure many other older people have had similar experiences. What is me when I was 21 and what is me now are two different things. Thus, I cannot even be sure of the existence of my own body as I lose communication with parts of it.

To discuss the social implications of an ethical theory does not presuppose any society exists. If I can imagine parts of my body which I no longer feel, if I can bury myself in a good movie to the point of imagining myself in the midst of its characters, why cannot I imagine other people, and even other people in combination? To address the social conscience does not require anything more than my imagination. If, as I think, there is a Universe of which I am only a small part, perhaps the creatures of my imagination will behave as those in Nature. This exercise is no less or more than what transpires in physics and mathematics lectures, where objects of study are defined, propositions made, and truth or falsity determined.

Therefore, to be committed to a subjectivist theory is not the same thing as to foreswear proposing and examining things in a public domain, even if that domain is the merest will o' the wisp of one's imagination. Whether the theory has any application remains to be decided by those will o' the wisps, if any, that happen to be flitting about.
 

Notes: Biological Naturalism
 

I have been critical of naive realists and other kinds of realists generally. It surprises some people that I am also critical of the so-called biological naturalists whose work I often read and quote. I am critical of biological naturalists not for their science, but for their philosophy.

The critical issues are reductionism and systems. Some biological naturalists seem desirous of a fully reductionist approach to ethics. I include Dr. DeWaals in this group, probably because he is a primatologist who ventured into ethics. DeWaals wants to give a scientific explanation for pseudo-moral behavior in animals, which opens the way for a similar explanation in H. sapiens. In his studies of primates, DeWaals is at pains to show that reciprocity is a common pattern of social behavior. He believes reciprocity underlies moral behavior governed by the Golden Rule. Other biological naturalists also point out reciprocity as a basic behavior with moral implications. But, the question I do not find answered in that work is whether the described social behavior(s) are voiluntary. Of course, if voluntary choice is not part of one's definition of ethics, this deficiency doesn't matter; but, then, what's the point of studying ethics or making ethical claims?
 

The systems issue is involved in the metaphysics of Mind and, I believe, in ethics. Just as Mind can be taken as an illusion our brains practice upon ourselves, but nonetheless an epistomological reality, ethics and morals are an illusion associated with social behavior, but nonetheless an epistomological reality. Describing mind and morals as systems is not to grant any ontological status to the subjects of our theories; i.e., they do not have to have some sort of separate existence in the way that matter, the stuff of our Universe, does. In my view, they are insubstantial: neither eidos nor form nor essence. What they are is something we humans observe. Until an ET comes along, we have no idea whether anyone else will observe them; i.e., whether morals are just another trick of our brains. Until it can be shown that there's nothing there, I think it is valid to continue ethical studies.
 

My justification for proposing an ethical theory is my strong belief that I make voluntary choices, and that I observe similar behavior in others. Voluntary choice, even if ultimately found to be an illusion, is the touchstone of all ethics. It is the same in optics: whatever photons ultimately "are," we have a strong experience of light and the various behaviors associated with it. It is not inappropriate to study optics, and make theories about light, so long as our work is not inconsistent with whatever the stuff is eventually found to be. Ethics, if nothing else, is a way of looking at the thoughts and behavior of moral agents, not the particulars of individuals or species.

Norms

The concept of a norm is difficult. Norms are often difficult to understand and apply. Even if understood, they are often ignored or misapplied. So, I start this discussion with some outlines of what norms are and are not.

Norms, broadly construed, are the rules, regulations or guidelines that exist in a society for the purpose of classifying and judging the social and individual behavior of its members. Norms are social, not personal, in nature, so only exist in those societies sufficiently developed to have a non-personal existence, usually represented in one or more sub-cultures.
 

Norms have social and individual prerequisites: they do not exist in a vacuum. I think it safe to say that tigers do not have or observe norms, nor do rabbits, worms, clams, trees and bacteria. To have a norm is to be sufficiently intelligent to perceive its existence, to be able to ferret out a certain pattern of behavior among one's peers. It is very unlikely that loners have any norms, not even  those unfortunates abandoned on desert islands at an early age. Again, norms are social entities recognized by creatures that participate in society. Because societies do not of themselves remember things, norms are stored in or by individuals. I think it highly unlikely that there are any ghosts or spirits which serve as "norm libraries." No people, no norms. This fact makes norms one of those peculiar things, like consciousness and ideas, that exist while being found nowhere in particular. All of those peculiarities require an agency to maintain their presence and effectiveness, which makes them mandatory symbiotes, like parasites and viruses.
 

Besides the intelligence required to recognize, memorize and propagate norms, individuals must have the ability to interpret and follow them, or to ignore them. Norms are at least guidelines; they suggest behavior. Norms do not drive members of society into obedience: individuals sometimes obey them, sometimes not. Of course, a norm that is always ignored or disobeyed cannot be a norm: it must be effective at least some of the time (for some reason or other, but not necessarily always the same reason). The fact that norms are considered, but not always followed, shows that voluntary choice is required in their application. In short, norms apply to moral agents in society.
 

Intelligent creatures may externalize norms by representing them in some medium; i.e., in a language. In modern times, this is usually accomplished in writing. A norm can be illustrated in theater or film, or as a painting or sculpture. All of those forms are creations of moral agents intended to memorize and remind observers of norms. The famous Cecil B DeMille film, The Ten Commandments, is such a work, designed to impress orthodox Christians with a Biblical story about the beginnings of their moral code. More famous is the Wheel of Buddha, which shows the various, cyclical phases of life, thereby inspiring one to reflect on what it is all about. Memorials in the world's capitals are intended to show who did what to whom and why, thus illustrating and exemplifying that nation's character. All of those forms are meaningful to moral agents in society, as they are intended to promote certain attitudes and behaviors while discouraging others. Externalization, especially as demonstration, is a key step in teaching norms. The naive do not have to invent norms all over again, or go through a lengthy process of experimentation, to know what is expected.
 

Before going much farther, it is important to distinguish morals from mores; i.e., customs, habits and manners. Social mores are what we study in cultural anthropology, sociology and other disciplines concerned with de facto human social behavior. All of those studies are a subset of Ethology, the study of animal behavior. (Animals are creatures such as crocodiles, birds, rats, cats, dogs and humans.) We can study the mores of social creatures, such as birds and dogs, as well as humans. Mores are the behavioral patterns members of a society express in public. Social creatures communicate with each other through appearance, sound, touch, smell and in other programmed ways that are mores. I concede in advance of further argument that most social behavior is described as mores. There is, however, a small portion of social behavior that is not programmed, which is the result of voluntary choice. Such voluntary behavior is moral to the extent that it is what one ought to do, not just what one must do. A confusion arises because, in many cases, moral agents may make the same choices and perform the same acts over and over, so those performances become customary and usual - as in social mores. For example, it is customary and usual for people to contribute to charities during Saturnalia, but that is not a requirement for proper social functioning. Charitable contributions, especially during a time when that activity is emphasized, are indeed social mores, but they are also the result of individual decisions. Of course, contributions might be made without thought simply in compliance with customs; i.e., to demonstrate good manners. But, when these contributions are made in privacy, say on the Internet, without any public recognition, they are probably the choice of the contributor, not the result of compulsion or programming. While there is overlap, examination of the case is likely to determine in which category a particular act or instance falls, morals or mores.

Moral judgements are made by individuals, not societies, at least in all the societies I know about. That is because society does not have a will of its own, even if it often appears otherwise. Nevertheless, society can be a repository of moral values and ethical principles, not only in organizing the creation and management of externalities, but also in unconsciously training and guiding behavior. The voluntary choices of individuals may be exhibited in their acts, which may influence the behavior of others. Members of society who have not made an original choice might act according to the choices they have seen implemented; i.e., example influences a society of copycats. When moral choices become manners, as in asking rather than commanding or just doing, members of society are directed toward moral behavior. The sorts of acts approved by moral judgements might be interlocking; i.e., when performance of one act tends to encourage the performance of others, as in "please ..." and "thank you." This latter case is usually thought of as social rituals. Thus it is not a waste of time to consider social mores in connection with morality, as that study may help in discovering norms buried in culture.

Norms are evolutionary, not static. I think this is a fact, obvious to students of History, which I have obliquely described as "moral evaporation." While societies usually proscribe murder, what consitutes murder has changed in time and space. Murder is a sub-class of Homicide, a killing of a human that, according to recent laws, involves malice and aforethought. Murder is not accidental. But, until modern times, murder in flagrante delicto was excusable, a mere homicide, because the adulterous sinners had condemned themselves, even when the murderer (presumably the cuckolded spouse) was in full possession of its faculties and acted calmly with deliberation. Islamic societies governed under Sharia Law allow honor killings as homicides, not murder. Similarly, different societies treat usury differently, in ways dependent on their historical development and current needs. In some Islamic countries such as Pakistan, the Quranic prohibition of charging interest is being avoided by laws which create other financial mechanisms that serve similar purposes. Pakistan is needful of massive foreign investment, so is finding ways to encourage it, Sharia law or no.
 

As I understand these things, that norms change is probably the most important fact about them. This means they are not immutable, but only apply at some times and places. The lack of fixity suggests even more: the norms commonly taught as commandments or held up as standards are pufferies. I think it is worth a short digression to analyze a few of these bon mots.

Golden Rule

A leading normative candidate for debunking is the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." This aphorism is lately praised by many biological naturalists, as it parallels Reciprocity found in many social animals, particularly primates. It is also suggested by studies of outcomes in the Prisoners Dilemma which show that co-operation is the best long-term strategy. It is also a shorthand version of Kant's Categorical Imperative. It is taught to children over and over, and is quoted in countless situations. Almost everyone, everywhere has heard some version of this rule for more than two millennia.

The basic problem presented by the Golden Rule is that it doesn't work. People simply do not observe it. It is not at all certain the world would be a better place if this rule were always applied.

What if everyone wanted to be rich, so wished that people would give them some money? If everyone in North Amerca sent me $1, I would become very rich, very fast. Of course, if I observed the same rule with respect to others by sending them money, I would be stripped of everything I have very quickly. If, under the circumstances now prevailing in North America, I gave away all that I have, it is very unlikely that anyone would even notice, much less reciprocate my Good Intentions. So, application of the Golden Rule in North America with respect to money is likely to lead to ruin. Even if most others contributed to my well being, I would not be better off, if I am also under an injunction to contribute to others because of the Golden Rule. Thus, at best, applying the Golden Rule in the case of money breaks even.

The Golden Rule. is not usually construed as directly applying to acts; i.e., it is a recommendation about intentions, not behavior. In that interpretation, it is most similar to Kant's Good Will, for it depends on our wish that others would treat us the way we desire, so advises that we should approach others in a manner that encourages fulfillment of our desires. In other words, if we treat others nicely (whatever that means to each of us), we maximise our chances of being treated nicely. I think the Golden Rule even suggests that, if we show our willingness (intention) to treat others nicely, we improve our chances of reciprocal behavior. But is any of that really so?

One well known application of Good Intentions is in paving the road to Hell, so I am not unusual in challenging their wisdom in pursuit of good ends as well as their utility in the choice of means. Good Intentions only work when reciprocated; otherwise, anyone who acts on Good Intentions without expectation of reciprocal behavior is an easy mark for the unscrupulous. Saints have Good Intentions and act on them, which most often leads to their penury and abuse. At the moment of writing, I cannot think of any rich Saints (although there must be some, somewhere). Occasionally well intentioned people, such as Mother Teresa, rise to prominence and are well treated, probably because of leadership abilities and the luck of landing in places where they acquire followers. While Mother Teresa was very successful, most of her followers lead obscure, hard lives in the service of the even more unfortunate. In most cases, Good Intentions are neither reciprocated nor rewarded, which leaves their bearers at a disadvantage with respect to their peers. Thus it is said that Virture is its own reward.
 

Kant's Categorical Imperative is an Ideal; i.e., an end to be sought and a rule for doing the right thing. Good Intentions are a stance one might take toward the world; i.e., both a motive and a means of implementing good ends. Neither of these formulations say much about other moral agents: it is assumed that only one's own behavior is under control. Yet, in the "real world," what people do is highly interactive. People keep an eye on those around them in their homes and neighborhoods, at work and everywhere in public. Human beings are not isolated within neutronium spheres, oblivious of everything around them except themselves. Children may behave naively, but that innocence usually disappears in the teenage years when the struggle for social recognition and position sets in. During adolescence, people learn to assess the motives and likely behavior of others. At that time, people are sorted by their abilities and inclinations, as well as by their height, weight, general appearance, means and sex. We do not know which of us will be the future Einsteins, Jack Kennedys, or Mother Teresas when we are five years old. When we are ten years old, intimations of the future are upon some of us, but we usually don't recognize them at that age. When we reach fifteen, and certainly by twenty, it is pretty clear who is which. The adolescent decade of development is not solely the result of processes internal to each person. It is the result of  pushing and shoving, many trials, and the manipulations of elders. I think a large proportion of high school students could become geniuses in various professions, if that were a preferred status. As matters stand, most of those who do become geniuses pay a high penalty in other aspects of their lives in exchange. In practice, a talented artist or intellectual can only lead a decent life in similar company, which is why elite schools such as the New England Conservatory, Julliard, Ivy League colleges, MIT and Caltech exist. That is also why the rich wall themselves off in gated communities. When the sorting process is over - by the age of 20 for most people, and by age 30 for the rest - roughly homogeneous batches of five year olds have turned into differentiated, separate communities. The growth and development of adult human beings have little to do with moral maxims such as the Golden Rule. In everyday life, people make moral judgements based on their experiences of others in social contexts. Only children and Saints do things mainly out of Good Intentions without regard to consequences.
 

Lying, Cheating, Winning

If people do not solely act out of Good Intentions, then their behavior must in some respect fall short of ideal. There are usually good reasons for less than morally correct performances; e.g., survival or the desire to come out on top. Human beings, like other animals, are strongly driven to eat and drink their fill and live another day. As an old saying has it, there is not a man who does not wish another when drawing his last breath. Our bestial behavior regulates most of our waking moments, and enforces a need for sleep as well. The facts of our existence are a far cry from the demands of ethical behavior as prescribed by most philosophers, especially those influenced by Christianity and other mystery religions.

I think the most common form of unethical behavior is the simple lie, which underlies a great deal of other unethical behavior. Lying is voluntary; it is the creation of  a counter-factual or a different reality from that of one's immediate experience. We lie to ourselves and others all the time, everyday, a thousand times over. One kind of lie is make-believe, which we start practicing when a few years old. Another kind of lie is "manners," the fakery we use to sooth vanity and prevent the overt hostility that might result were the truth known. Those too shallow to know the difference are fooled and pleased by manners, but wiser heads understand the power relationships implicit in words and gestures. (These days, almost everyone of signficance has a consultant who advises on the true meaning of so-called body language.)

Lying is related in unfathomable ways to art and science, as those magicians conjure up otherwise unimagined worlds. Who would have thought we are all made of quarks linked by gluons buzzing around? Hamlet, unable to prove the accusations of his ghostly father, conjectures "the play's the thing in which I will catch the conscience of the King." Most of what we call our thoughts and feelings are fictions of our imagination, falsities by which we find solutions to the real problems of the moment: food, drink, elimination, sex and sleep. Plato's Parmenides jibed at Socrates, "What young man, will you do about hair, mud and filth?" Since very ancient times, we do not live as dogs, nor do we wish to do so (a wish Kant condemned), merely unconsciously responsive to our environments. We are more than merely intelligent, but unaware, robots. It is not simply that our perceptual apparatus is flawed, so that we see red when should see green, but that we invent stories to account for what we do see and even invent what we see. Unfortunately, unlike the machines we build and enslave, we do not have a built-in censors or device checkers that assure our eyes and ears are working properly.

Lying is at the heart of the success of TV and all the other theater arts, especially movies. We have named a genre of writing "fiction," to prevent the morally loaded word "lies" when talking about such books. Lies are absorbing. They create worlds of imagination and even their own internal logic. In science fiction, we easily travel from one day to another, one place to another, without limit or the annoyance of mere physical laws. Lies are implicit in computer games, and in computer software generally, for therein are created experiences which mold the minds of interactive users. The really important thing about lies is how easily they catch our brains aware, and turn our thinking in unpredictable directions. Lies confuse "reality" and "unreality," and break down those ancient distinctions, "experience," "ideas," "perception," "phenomena," "noumena," :"matter," "form." Which is what? Lies make it impossible to know.

But, do lies thereby distinguish the truth? That is, if we are able to discern a lie, does that somehow clarify what is true, or improve our ability to know what is true? I think not. That's the whole point of Godel's Proof: that there are propositions not provably true or false. Outside mathematics, there is a huge volume of happenings - perhaps, proto-events? - that we cannot characterize as facts or truths or as anything at all. What was there, and what not, depends entirely on the ability to process and classify the data. Most of what goes by us is background radiation, white noise, neither true nor false nor anything at all. Lies may point out some vacancies in that background - a non-existence - or they may propose some existence - a known pattern. In that they are no more helpful than truths, for truths and lies live an equivalent existence. Once one is known, the other is at least suspected. But, if there are no grounds for determining which is the case, possibly truth and lies stand independently and not in relation to each other. That is, if truth or falsity is multi-valued, themselves qualified,  the negation of one does not produce the other. The worst part of the idea of lies, is that lies undermine distinctions - what is black? what is white? - leaving only gray.

Lies are absolutely necessary in binding people to each other. Whether in marriage or raising children, dealing with one's extended family and neighbors, contending with fellow workers or coping with a larger society, a million fictions are invented and acted out to prevent chaos. We have to believe that the milk bought at a local store is safe and healthful, and even satisfying, even if we don't have the opportunity to compare hundreds of other competing brands. Imagine the chaos when just one person makes a ruckus at the checkout stand; for instance, when someone takes out an item from the order, especially when this happens mid-stream. Consider the credit card that doesn't work, the splotched check, the person who drops some stuff on the floor, etc. None of those things come close to the mischief created by those who intentionally sabotage a store's sales (for whatever reason). In the same way, most children believe their parents' instructions until they reach a certain age, which is what makes living with teenagers hell for a lot of people. There are many more examples. The simple fact is that lies are like transmission fluid: a certain amount of slippage is necessary to prevent stalls, allow changing gears and cushion a delicate engine from a bumpy ride.

Lies are especially important in so-called political processes, such as getting ahead at work and elected to office. Unless an appointment is ex post facto tailor-made to fit the appointee, scarcely anyone ever fits the job description. The reason for widespread use of temporary and probationary appointments is to screen those chosen because no one really knows how the candidate will perform. Those responsible for choosing a candidate, even in highly structured civil service or college entrance examinations, use variable and (probably) undefinable standards in making their choice. While those selected may have a better chance to succeed than those rejected, no one will ever know whether that is true. The selected are often assisted to do better, once they arrive, and the standards for approving tenure are often arbitrary. Those who make it are often passed by the nodding of heads, not the application of rigid, verifiable standards. Heracles may have cleaned out the Augean stables unnecesarilly, as he may have gained acceptance by doing a neighbor's smaller, cleaner barn. But, Heracles always does it all. The gods are like that, whereas mere humans are always partial and incomplete. We need lies to cover up our errors and shortcomings. Lies are implict in the notion of "good enough."

Lies are a critical component of cheating: to cheat is to deceive. "Cheating" is defined by reference to rules; it is the attempt to change outcomes otherwise determined by a system. It is common knowledge that 2 + 2 = 4, but cheaters claim the result is anything but 4. In making such a claim, it is not enough that a cheater proposes something illogical or false: cheating involves a decision to do something wrong. Cheaters promulgate unethical principles or immoral maxims for their own purposes (motives). Cheaters are not merely ignorant of the rules of the game, they actively undermine them. So, cheaters are ethical creatures, because they make voluntary decisions about how things ought to be. Cheating thereby reveals an unfortunate fact about ethics: its cases are all too often revealed by the wicked and immoral.

It is not a digression to note the Darwinian evolution works by trial and error. The changes which occur in each generation are not so large as to bring about the demise of the evolving species, even if some individuals die prematurely. Ethics evolves in the same way. In the ethical context, cheaters try the system by introducing a variant. If they succeed, in due course everyone learns the cheater's trick or how to defend against it, and that becomes part of the system. Magicians rely on our not looking at the moving parts; i.e., they rely on distracton. We know the magician has fooled (cheated) us, but do not learn the trick or defend against it because we consider it an harmless entertainment. These days, very few people choose a magician's career because it is usually not well paid or influential. The social defense against magic - marginalization - was learned and adopted in modern times despite thousands of years during which Shamans, witches and other practitioners of magic were key members of society. Empirical science displaced magic because science is more certain and effective than magic, and it also shows that magic is wishful thinking. But science itself is another cheat, for it is based on probabilities, not certainties: it is only an improved, more accurate variation.

Evolution is about winning; i.e., about survival long enough to reproduce. Lies and cheating are essential in the evolutionary process. If everything were perfect at the start, by definition any evolution would reduce the ability to survive and reproduce. If perfect things cannot reproduce, that is not a fault so long as they can survive forever. But, if there is death sooner or later, there is either a need to reproduce or to improve the system of survival. Of course, this last statement assumes a will to live, a desire shared by all known organisms whether consciously or unknowlingly. We humans feel the will to live consciously, as an urge, so attribute it to animals, plants and bacteria as well, even if their will to live is simply a matter of the way they are put together. (But, as I have argued elsewhere, consciousness is simply a matter of the way we are put together.)

Normative Networks

What the foregoing shows, I believe, is that human societies are hypocritical. They actually operate on principles quite different from those taught children and otherwise extolled as guides to virtue. In fact, people lie and cheat, and do much worse things, in order to survive, to win in the game of life. This claim is quite different from models of altruism and not the same as selfish genes. I believe the explanation of human social behavior lies in the nature of networks.

In thinking of a society as a network,  its members - individuals - are its nodes. The nodes are interconnected by the feelings people have for each other, as well as by expectations, commitments and ritual performances. Small societies, such as families or roommates, aggregate into larger societes, both with respect to the individuals and the aggregate; i.e., social groups are almost always nodes of a larger society. Besides households, common social groups include governments, businesses, religions and many other special purpose organizations. Structured organizations, such as business and government, explicitly define the interactions of individuals. Unstructured groups, such as loose associations and friendships, usually operate on unstated (implicit) rules of interaction. There are always rules governing the interactions, but we (nodes) are not always conscious of them.

Moral maxims are rules that govern interactions among nodes, both at individual and group levels; i.e., there are moral relationships. Many maxims are explicit (externalized), but some are implicit. Whichever they are, participants in society are aware of them when choosing what to do. That awareness need not always be explicit: what is done can be the habitual result of an initial choice. It is only when the rule is explicit and consciously evaluated by an intelligent agent that voluntary choice occurs. (Habits can be secondary consequences of voluntary choice.) In such cases, agents act in an ethical or unethical manner depending on whether they decide to observe valid moral maxims.

Now, it can't be quite as simple as where the foregoing seems to lead. After all, I just noted that people regularly lie and cheat. I think the complication is this: people don't make choices in order to be good or do the right thing. What they choose is what will satisfy their relations with others. In making that claim, I need to show how it is different from some classical ethical theories.

Utilitarianism

It might be wrongly claimed that normative networks are just a variant of the Utiltitarian Principle: 'the greatest good for the greatest number.' It is true that one possible simplification of relations on a network is something like Utilitarianism. So, I will grant a network theory can include utilitarian  measures of goods. But, networked norms are more than that.
 

It might be suggested that a utilitarian theory that weights the meaure of good between various nodes would do. That is, instead of a simple summing of goods over the nodes, the goods might be weighted for each permuation of nodes and then summed. But, networked norms are more than that.

The key difference from the foregoing is twofold. First, in social networks, the nodes interact. What A does affects B, which, in turn, changes what B would have done in the absence of A. The same feedback loop applies over all permutations of nodes. Thus, social networks are more accurately modelled by highly interconnected neural networks. All of the nodes may have input sensors from all of the other nodes, as well as input from combined outputs. This means nodal output can feed back into all other nodes separately or combined. Each node senses (weights) those outputs according to its own algorythm. This implies the second main difference: there is not a common measure of "good."  Each node has its own measure.

Normative networks, unlike utilitarian calculations, are non-linear. Simple summing might occur, but that is not usually the case. After stimulation, the network may settle on a value, although coming to a steady state is not required. The settled value with respect to a given set of inputs - circumstances - is what we call a moral maxim. Thus, most societies have concluded that murder is not permitted, although society may order executions. On the other hand, abortion has been a hot topic in many societies since ancient times, so it is neither a generally accepted moral maxim that abortion is always permissible nor that it is impermissible. Abortion is not a settled matter.

In normative networks, the nodes do not share universally quanitified goods, nor do they have to weigh all other nodes equally. Most people (nodes) consider those nearest them more than those far away. The weight assigned nodes drops exponentially with distance. Distance is not just how many meters there are between nodes. It also matters how far a node is in time; i.e., physical distance has to be measured in space-time. Furthermore, "intrinsic factors" are also a measure of distance. Thus, for most people, parents are closer than grandparents, not only in space and time, but also in shared behavior. Thus, most people inherit their political beliefs, so are far more likely to listen to ancestral voices than others when making political choices. While space-time distances can be measured in specified, public ways, the other intrinsic factors are subjective, so can only be measured by whatever the individual (node) reports. As previously argued, we have to accept the judgements of moral agents as a given. Whether or not they are good or right judgements will depend on  how they are valued in the network. Thus, murder might be an acceptable act for some participants in human societies, but the network determination almost always rejects that judgement. Since morality is social in nature, the generalization is that murder is immoral in nearly all cases.

 

 

Conventionalism

Does a network theory boil down to merely observing conventions? That is, since morality is what society says it is, what is good or right is just a matter of convention or common agreement.

This objection to normative networks would make the convention more fundamental than the network. I agree that conventions are produced by social networks; meaning that settled results become rules of behavior (moral maxims). Conventions are what each participant (node) observes as feedback from others. In a normative network, it is the process which is more fundamental, not the particular result.

The contract theory of ethics, a form of conventionalism, comes nearer to explaining how the norms are established. In a contract theory, at some point participants are engaged in setting the rules of agreement (Rawls' "initial position"), and then make particular agreements. The most famous difficulty with all contract theories of ethics is there is no historical record that supports the proposed foundation. There never was a meeting to settle on ethical rules. Quite the contrary: the major religions propose ethical principles and moral maxims as given by the gods. Most non-religious groups attribute their ethical princicples to a very few individuals or lawgivers. Even modern constitutionalists know their documents were drawn up by the few, not the many. Since contract theory starts with an idea that never happened, it imagines what it must have been like had it happened.

Normative networks dispense with all that hanky-panky. We need not suppose there ever was a meeting of the minds. What evolved, what was settled, was not invented by anyone at all or by any committee. Moral maxims become an "ought" in a gradual process of trial and error. This may seem mysterious, but it is not. The process is entirely analogous to Darwinian evolution.

Conventionalism is a doctrine that correctly locates the repository of moral maxims in society. As I understand non-contractual conventionalist ethics, individuals behave morally because they have been taught to do so. There might be other reasons for conformity, such as love or fear, native dispositions or genetic makeup. Unfortunately, what conventionalism cannot explain is why these moral maxims, not others. Thus it is simply a statement that what is, is. I feel this is an unsatisfactory accounting of ethics, given the long history of struggle over conflicting moral values. For example, in 1860, what reasons would a conventionalist offer to abolish slavery? Clearly, once the Civil War was over and slavery abolished, it is easy enough for a conventionalist to oppose slavery on the ground of present standards. But it would seem conventionalists would have to support the Confederate Cause before that conclusion. For that reason, I think of conventionalism as nothing more nor less than conformism or, in its worst aspect, opportunism.

Normative networks provide a mechanism to develop a history of moral maxims. It is possible to review the states of the network prior to the present one to determine how it settled. Ethical principles can be drawn from generalizations of previous settlements, which might give someone grounds to criticize a particular moral maxim, such as slavery is permissible. Normative networks are not required to be "logically" consistent. All that is required is that the network settle on what is acceptable, and what not. This settlement does not necessarily appear to each node as an "ought' or a duty, nor even as something in the best interests of an individual or group. Rather, in most cases the desired behavior appears as what is feasible.

 

 

Consequentialism

If Utilitarianism is at most a special case of normative networks, and Conventionalism merely reflects a cross section of settlements at a given time, and if normativity is enforced by feasibility, aren't normative networks just an instance of Consequentialism? That is, isn't the guiding principle of all those interactions just the consequences of behavior?

It is true that socialized individuals usually consider the consequences of their acts, whereas desert islanders need not worry about approval or retribution. It is also true that, in a general way, what becomes a social norm has been filtered by experience. After all, neither individuals nor society are likely to survive if they ignore consequences altogether. This is just to say that all ethical principles and moral maxims have to specify feasible activities. But, is ethical content limited to what works, or is there some other consideration? This question raises two important questions. First, what is the role of the counter-factual in ethical principles and moral judgements? More generally, second, are there any abstract principles which go beyond mere generalization of consequences?

If Consequentialism is a relatively simple theory, looking only at various acts as trials which did or didn't work, then it probably fails as a general ethical theory. The theory may have merit as a guideline to what happens when one intends this or that in various situations. But that amounts to a piece of sociology or psychology or both, and not an ethical  theory. Ethical theories pose an ought or a duty, which impels moral agents to do (or omit) certain things and not others. They are more than handbooks to efficacious actions. Of course, Consequentialists can overcome this hurdle by adding the ethical principle, 'you ought to do what works.' Unfortunately, that only opens Pandora's box as, for example, that would justify Hitler's invasion of France in June, 1940 and many other things usually considered atrocities.

Normative networks behave in a consequential manner, because what are selected as social norms result from successful social behavior. (Here "successful" means both the done and undone.) But they are not consequentialist in the sense that each act is evaluated only with respect to its consequences. Because, in this theory, moral agents make moral judgements and perform moral acts, because moral agents are free to use any ethical principle or moral maxim they please in making those judgements, and because society functions as a network with internal, non-linear feedback loops in adjusting to the acts of its moral agents, the final results are social norms that are not directly or causally related to any particular circumstance. That is, in this theory, social norms are not about consequences, but appear as generalized demands on the members of society.
 

In the foregoing, very brief discussion of some important ethical theories, what should stand out is that traditional ethical theories are about individuals, not societies. This theory supposes there are social networks of a kind that produce normativity; i.e., normativity is a feature of society usually expressed in social norms. For that reason, norms are closely tied to culture. Laws are a form of norms. The system of justice is an application of social norms. This theory of normativity leads directly to a theory of justice and law. This is not to say that all of ethics is expressed as notions of justice or law, because much of it remains an unwritten guide buried in culture. Most members of society are guided by their culture, which, as I said in GSQ, is a combination of beliefs, habits and rituals. When acting out culture, individuals are only moral in the secondary sense that they are agents of a moral code. For that reason, they are not fully responsible for their behavior, but society is. Only those individuals who are moral agents, who actually make moral judgements (implying they make voluntary choices), are responsible for their own behavior.

Some early implications of the foregoing are:

At this point, I think the best way to get an idea of what normative networks are like is to examine a few cases.

Next: Situations